National identity as an EU constitutional law concept

It is no secret that, as a supranational public body, the European Union has the authority to impose mandatory norms upon the Member States, which, on their part, do not have the ability to refuse complying, without risking rather unpleasant sanctions. This is based on the principle of the primacy of EU law. This principle is applied to every single EU norm and could effectively cause the non-application even of constitutional norms if they contradict an EU norm. There is, however, one exception from the principle, allowing a Member State not to fulfill its obligations under EU law, without facing negative consequences.

 

This exception stems directly from the “constitutional charter” of the Union. It is necessary to point out that the EU doesn’t have a codified Constitution like the one nation states have. It has, however the Founding Treaties, which have been called a constitutional charter by the Court in the case Les Verts. Art. 4, para. 2 of the TEU, known as the national identity clause contains this exceptional case:

 

“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government”.

 

In Semov’s view, the clause essentially states that a Member State has the fundamental right to defend its national constitutional identity and when it’s been jeopardized by an EU law norm, the State can freely divert from the prescribed behavior, without being the object of an attack by the European Commission (Semov, 2017).

 

With the deepening of the integration process in the 1960’s and 1970’s concerns among national political elites began to lurk with regards to the survival of the internal and, more specifically, the constitutional law of Member States. This led to some Member States’ Constitutional courts undermining the effect of European law (e.g., Germany, France and Italy). That’s why, in 1992, with the Treaty of Maastricht, it was made clear that Member States retain their national sovereignty, while institutionalizing the principle of respect for national identity. The clause was further developed for the project of the Constitution of Europe. The latter never came into force, but the redaction of the said text was kept and was introduced in the TEU in 2007.

 

The constitutional (fundamental) function of the clause is ambivalent. Firstly, it reaffirms the nation state’s sovereign power and calms fears over federalization of the Union. Secondly, it serves as a counterbalance to the before-mentioned primacy principle as well as the principle of sincere cooperation (which states that Member States should duly fulfill their duties towards the EU), effectively invalidating certain obligations Member States have towards the Union. The clause actually imposes upon the Union the responsibility to respect the national-constitutional identities (NCI). In this way, it serves as a guarantor of the safety of national sovereignty, or even a substitute for it (Belov, 2017).

 

Unfortunately, due to the lack of courage or desire by the judges in Luxembourg, for the first years after its adoption, the clause has been perceived simply as a political declaration. That was overcome by the Court’s jurisprudence (see further bellow), but the latter remains scarce, rendering the task of defining the national-constitutional identity quite difficult.

 

What, then is national constitutional identity? Due to the relative lack of decisions regarding the NCI, the question remains highly theoretical and its conceptualization depends heavily on judicial dialogue (the intertwining and mutual reference of decisions by the supranational courts ECJ and ECHR) and the national (mainly constitutional) courts and theoretical analysis. Here, we will outline very briefly some conceptual considerations and then reinforce them with a few Court rulings.

 

The approaches to the problem vary from strictly positivist to extracting arguments from other scholarly disciplines, such as history, sociology and anthropology for outlining the concrete elements of the NCI. Thus, the NCI can be defined as a set of unchangeable constitutional postulates, that are not only written in the Constitution, but are engraved in the nation’s psyche as a result of complex sociological and historical reasons, and precisely because of the latter are, institutionalized in its Constitution (a multidisciplinary approach, that the ECJ also seems to accept). The Court at Luxembourg finds that the norm of the constitution has to be so unique to the nation or the latter has to put such a meaning to it, that this norm is entirely specific to and characteristic of that exact nation. Faraguna and Drinóczi refer to “three dimensions of identity” in that context (Faraguna and Drinóczi, 2022). We will now try to add some concrete examples to this abstract formula.

 

Apart from theoretical studies, the other line of development of a concrete and outlined NCI doctrine consists of the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the national (mainly constitutional) courts and the judicial dialogue between them. It is, therefore, very helpful to examine specific decisions that fill the abstract concept with meaningful content. At the beginning, the ECJ focused mainly on the linguistical and cultural aspect of identity (Hristev, 2021). An example is Runevič-Vardyn, where the ECJ allows the state to follow its own linguistic rules in certificates of civil status in regards to foreigners, despite the principle of non-discrimination. Later it shifted to a more constitution-centric approach. In other words, the ECJ didn’t just respect the cultural aspect of national identity, but the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the States (Bon, 2014).

 

A key decision of the ECJ is Omega. In this case the German authorities prohibit a laser tag game with the argument that it degrades the human being. The developers of the game start a court procedure that finds its way to the ECJ. The latter states that, due to the totalitarian past of the German state, and the specific (unique) status that human dignity holds within the German Grundgezetz (Art. 1) because of that totalitarian history, human dignity is a part of the German NCI and therefore can be used as an excuse to defy its EU obligations. It should be noted: the concept of the respect for one’s dignity is found in a lot of Constitutions around the world (Bulgarian, Spanish, Italian, etc.), but exactly due to the specific nature of the concept in Germany, the ECJ finds it a part of their NCI. In theory, if the Omega case had taken place in Spain, the Spanish would have had to fulfill their EU duties.

 

Another interesting case is that of Sayn-Wittgenstein. There, the ECJ allows Austria to refuse recognizing the part of a name of a German nobleman, containing a nobility title. That possibility stems from the Adelsaufhebungsgesetz (Nobility abolition act). According to the ECJ, this act, due to the unique historical meaning it has in Austria, constitutes an element of Austria’s NCI and can serve as an exception to the EU law’s primacy.

 

An example of a national constitutional court filling the concept with meaning is that of the German federal constitutional court and its 2009 Lisbon decision. There, the court in Karlsruhe states that the German NCI coincides with the inalienable (eternal) clauses of the German basic law. These are such clauses, that cannot be changed or derogated under any circumstances whatsoever. One of them for example is the aforementioned clause, that proclaims the highest respect for human dignity. The judges basically declare, that an EU norm cannot under any conditions have primacy over these eternal clauses.

 

In conclusion, although it might seem that EU institutions can, in principle, impose whatever rule they desire upon Member States, this is not always the case. The uncodified Constitution of the Union provides a clear guarantee against such power. Even though the jurisprudence regarding the NCI is scarce, national constitutional courts should strive to outline more concretely the scope of their states’ NCI and (with the aim) to convince the ECJ to do so more often. This will be clear evidence of the very much alive national sovereignty and will help strike a better power balance between EU Member States and Brussels.

 

References:

Belov, M. The Bulgarian constitutional identity. Sofia: Sibi, 2017 (in Bulgarian)
Bon, P. The national or constitutional identity, a new juridical notion in Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional ISSN: 0211-5743, num. 100, January-april 2014 (in Spanish)
Faraguna, Pietro; Drinóczi, Tímea: Constitutional Identity in and on EU Terms, VerfBlog, 2022/2/21
Hristev, H. The relationship between domestic law and european union law in light of the case law of the court of justice concerning the constitutional identity of the member states of the EU. annual of Sofia University „St. Kliment Ohridski“ Faculty of law, Volume 87, 2021 (in Bulgarian)
Semov, A. The juridical system of the EU. Sofia: EU law institute, 2017 (in Bulgarian)
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jugdgement of the Second senate of 30 june 2009, the Lisbon treaty decision
CJCE, 15. 7. 1964, Costa c/ENEL, 6/64
CJCE, 23. 4. 1986, Les Verts, 294/83
CJCE, 14. 10. 2004, Omega, C-36/02
ECJ, 12. 05. 2011, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C-391/09
ECJ, 22.12.2010, Sayn-Wittgenstein, C-208/09

 

Ognyan Pavlov